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RETURN TO THE PENTAGON 
Marshall and the Korean War 
On July 24, 1950, George Catlett Marshall dashed off a note to his goddaughter 
and confidante, Rose Page Wilson. "I have been trembling on the edge of being 
called again into public service in this crisis," wrote the general, "but I hope 
I get by unmolested, but when the President motors down and sits under our 
oaks and tells me of his difficulties, he has me at a disadvantage."1 
Twenty days earlier, on Independence Day, President Harry Truman had 
indeed motored to Marshall 's home in Leesburg, Virginia, to discuss the crisis in 
Korea, which had begun when the Korean People's Army (KPA) of Communist 
North Korea violated the thirty-eighth parallel and invaded South Korea on 
June 25. Truman and his advisers incorrectly assumed that the Soviet Union 
had instigated the attack. 2 South Korea, officially the Republic of Korea (ROK), 
was led by President Syngman Rhee; though corrupt, it was at least partially 
democratic and recognized by the United Nations.3 "I felt certain that if South 
Korea was allowed to fall communist leaders would be emboldened to override 
189 
190 CHAPTER 8 
nations closer to our own shores," Truman wrote in his memoirs, predicting 
such an outcome would have led to both "a third world war" and the discrediting 
of the United Nations. Ifhe was also spurred by the intense public criticism he 
had received after China had become a Communist country in 1949, it went 
unmentioned in his memoirs. 4 Truman had authorized naval and air support of 
the ROK on June 25. After a June 27 UN Security Council resolution authorizing 
military action, he also ordered ground support on June 30.5 Truman discussed 
these events with Marshall on July 4 and, according to a White House memo-
randum, "was very much heartened by General Marshall's warm endorsement 
of the President's recent actions."6 
Whether directly or obliquely, Truman apparently raised the possibility of 
Marshall becoming the secretary of defense that day under the oaks of Leesburg, 
which explains the general's comment to Rose that he was "trembling on the edge 
of being called again into public service" but hoped to escape "unmolested."7 His 
reluctance was understandable. He was now sixty-nine years old, and Truman 
had already called him out of retirement once. He had retired from the army 
in 1945, only to be asked the next day by Truman to be his special presidential 
envoy to China. That morphed into a momentous stint as the secretary of state, 
which ended with his second retirement in January 1949. Even this second 
retirement had come with an asterisk, because Marshall had agreed to serve as 
the president of the American Red Cross. By April 28, 1950, he had traveled an 
estimated 35,000 miles on Red Cross business. Still, he had found time during 
the winter of 1949-50 to spend with his wife, Katherine, at their winter horn<' 
in Pinehurst, North Carolina. When not traveling for the Red Cross, he had 
enjoyed many hours of horse riding, hunting, and fishing. The president w:1s 
suggesting that he trade these happy moments for the weight of running tlw 
Pentagon during a time of undeclared war. 8 
Truman had lost confidence in the current secretary of defense, Louis 
A. Johnson. A "brusque" and "bullying" man, according to military historia 11 
Allan Millett, Johnson did not get along well with other members of the ca h 
inet. Moreover, he had now been discredited by his support for small defensl' 
budgets prior to the Korean War.9 In contrast to the president's lack of trw:1 
in Johnson, Truman had almost limitless confidence in General Marshall. 111 I 11 
his already distinguished public career, Marshall had demonstrated remark 
able skill in working with all branches of the armed forces, as well as with I I w 
State Department, Congress, and American allies. At a time when the Uni11 ·d 
States once again found itself needing to w:q:,1· n,:dition w:1rf:1r · and build 1111 
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its armed forces, he was a much better choice for defense secretary than the 
abrasive Johnson. 11 
On September 6, Truman asked Marshall directly ifhe would head the Pen-
tagon. The general agreed, though he expressed concern that his appointment 
might bring criticism of Truman from those who held Marshall responsible 
for the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government in China in 1949. 
Far from dissuading Truman, however, the president saw this concern as fur-
ther evidence of the general's greatness of character. Marshall told Truman he 
was only willing to serve for six months, or perhaps a year. He wanted Robert 
A. Lovett, a trusted protege who had once served as his undersecretary of state, 
to be the deputy secretary of defense. With Marshall's reluctant willingness 
confirmed, Truman forced a weeping Johnson to sign his letter of resignation 
on September 12, effective September 19.12 
Before Marshall could be confirmed, however, both houses of Congress had 
to approve a special one-time exception to the 1947 National Security Act, which 
denied eligibility for the office of defense secretary to any former commissioned 
officers of the armed forces who had been retired for fewer than ten years. During 
the hearings concerning this matter, Sen. William Jenner (R-Ind.) savaged 
Marshall as "a front man for traitors" and a "living lie." Another Republican 
senator, however, Leverett Saltonstall from Massachusetts, offered a heartfelt 
defense of the general, arguing that "if ever there was a life spent in the interest 
of our country, a life that is not a lie, it is the life of George C. Marshall." In 
spite of]enner's invective, both houses approved the exception. The Senate then 
voted 57-11 to approve Marshall's nomination as secretary of defense, and he 
was sworn in on September 21. 13 
In addition to Lovett, Marshall had already forged relationships with several 
people with whom he would be working. His relationship with the president 
dated back to when he was the army chief of staff and Truman was a senator. 
He had gained Truman's respect by cooperating in the senator's investigation of 
wasteful spending within the War Department. The current secretary of state, 
Acheson, had preceded Lovett as the undersecretary of state during Marshall's 
tenure in the State Department. Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS), had served with Marshall on the faculty of the Infantry School at 
Fort Benning in the early 1930s, when Marshall was the assistant commandant, 
and had gone on to command the Twelfth Army Group in Europe during World 
War II. A not her member of the JCS was the army chief of staff, Gen.]. Lawton 
"Lightnin[.!:Joe" Collins, who had likewise served on the Benning faculty with 
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EXTENSION OF THE DRAFT ACT 
"Extension of the Draft Act." Cartoon by James T. Berryman in the Washington 
Evening Star depicting ChiefJustice Fred M. Vinson (right) swearing in George C. 
Marshall (center) as secretary of defense in front of President Harry S. Truman (leji) . 
Circa 1950. Courtesy Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. 
Marshall before commanding the VII Corps in Europe. A third JCS member 
was the air force chief of staff, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, who had worked wit It 
Marshall in the War Department at the beginning of World War II.14 
One man who could not in any meaningful way be considered a Mar• 
shall protege, however, was Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the newly appointed 
commander-in-chief of UN forces in Korea. MacArthur-a Medal of Honor 
recipient, the loser and subsequent liberator of the Philippine Islands during 
World War II, and the democratizer of Japan-had already enjoyed one of the 
most storied careers in American military history. His recent appointment as 
UN commander was in addition to his roles as head of the Far East Command 
and supreme commander for the Allied Powers in J apan. 15 
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Marshall and MacArthur were both born in 1880, and both were now five-
star generals. Each had made a name for himself during World War I, though 
Marshall's had been as a staff officer-he had planned the Meuse-Argonne 
offensive-while MacArthur's had been as a decorated combat commander. 
MacArthur received permanent promotion to brigadier general in 1920, but 
Marshall not until 1936. During MacArthur's tenure as army chief of staff from 
1930 to 1935, he irritated Colonel Marshall by ordering his transfer from Fort 
Moultrie, South Carolina, to the Illinois National Guard in Chicago. Marshall 
protested, but to no avail. Promotions eventually caught up with Marshall, and 
he too became chief of staff from 1939 to 1945, a tenure coinciding with World 
War II. During the war, MacArthur became the commander of the Southwest 
Pacific Theater at Marshall's insistence. This was only one of many gestures of 
support that Marshall made toward MacArthur throughout the war, includ-
ing recommending him for the Medal ofHonor.16 Nevertheless, the two men 
differed significantly over grand strategy. Whereas Marshall generally favored 
the Europe-first strategy, MacArthur was always oriented toward the Pacific.17 
Not only did Marshall return to the Pentagon with several already formed 
relationships, he also brought with him a set of beliefs. He ardently believed 
in the importance of civilian control of the military. Just as in World War II, 
he still believed that Europe was more vital to American security than Asia. 
Having spent time in China himself, he believed that the Chinese Commu-
nists were heavily influenced by the Soviets, of whom he had acquired a late 
but hard-earned distrust.18 Forrest Pogue, Marshall's official biographer, also 
noted his "long opposition" to U.S. troops becoming involved in a ground war 
in Asia. 19 Unfortunately, it was too late to prevent this; American troops were 
very much at war in Asia when Marshall was sworn in as secretary of defense 
on September 21. 
The invasion of South Korea came at a time of smaller defense budgets and 
reduced troop strength for the United States. As ofJune 30, nine of the army's 
ten divisions were understrength, as were both marine divisions. 20 Moreover, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not commit all U.S. troops to Korea because 
they had to consider the possibility that the KP A's invasion of South Korea was 
merely the first prong of a larger global offensive by the Soviets or their allies; 
while American forces were occupied in Korea, other communist armies 
might strike at Formosa (Taiwan),Japan, or Berlin.21 By September, those U.S. 
troops who had been sent, as well as their ROK allies, had all been pushed into 
a defensive perimeter ringing the port of Pusan on the peninsula's southeast 
1~4 Cll /\ 1' ll ll 8 
coast. MacArthur proposed a daring scheme tu reverse the fortunes of w:1 r, 
however. He would sail the X Corps around the tip of Korea to land at lnch011, 
while the Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan perimeter. Inchon presented 
daunting challenges with its tricky tides, and the JCS vainly suggested th:11 
MacArthur seek a safer landing site. He refused. Toe Inchon landings proceed<:1 I
on September 15, and they succeeded spectacularly. Bradley groused that ii 
was the "luckiest military operation in history." Lucky or not, MacArthur had 
been vindicated, while the JCS "seemed like a bunch of nervous Nelli es to have 
doubted."22 Tuey would be hesitant to question MacArthur again. 23 
When Marshall became the defense secretary, the Inchon landing had jusl 
occurred. He now supported the momentous decision to allow MacArthur to 
conduct military operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel. On Septem 
ber 27, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted a directive to that effect. Marshal I. 
Acheson, and Truman all approved. It stated: 
Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed 
forces . In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military 
operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground oper-
ations north of the 38° parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such 
operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or 
Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a 
threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. 
MacArthur was explicitly forbidden from allowing any of his forces to enter or 
attack either China or the Soviet Union. To diminish the danger of intervention 
by either of these Communist countries, MacArthur was instructed that "as a 
matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast 
provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian 
border."24 
Marshall heard a rumor that Gen. Walton Walker, commander of the Eighth 
Army, would pause at the thirty-eighth parallel to regroup. The defense secretary 
feared that such an operational pause might prove uncomfortable to America's 
friends in the United Nations, since it might force them formally to approve 
operations north of the parallel. He suspected that they would prefer being 
presented with a fait accompli. He wrote to MacArthur on September 29, 1950, 
laying out these fears. "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategi-
cally to proceed north of[the] 38th parallel," he stressed, probably not realizing 
what a wide loophole he had just opened. 25 South Korean troops, compelled by 
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President Rhee, bl'gw rrnssi11g the parallel as early as the next day, though ii 
would be another week before U.S. troops ventured across. MacArthur 111:idl: a 
mistake, however, in ordering a second amphibious landing at Wonsa n, whir h 
unnecessarily complicated his logistics and delayed the UN advance into North 
Korea. Most of the KPA force escaped. 26 
Toe Chinese foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, warned o:q October 3 that (:hi11:1 
would intervene militarily if UN forces other than South Koreans crossed t lu · 
thirty-eighth parallel. The warning went largely unheeded in Washingto11, hu1 
Mao Zedong on October 8 ordered Chinese troops into North Korea.27 Mt'a 11~ 
while, MacArthur's September 27 orders had not contemplated a scenario i11 
which the Chinese invaded North Korea after his forces had crossed into Non h 
Korea themselves. The Joint Chiefs remedied this by drafting an addendum, 
approved by Marshall, Acheson, and Truman, and transmitted to MacArthur 
on October 9. In such a scenario, the UN commander should continue military 
engagement as long as there was "a reasonable chance of success." "In any case," 
the JCS told MacArthur, "you will obtain authorization from Washington prior 
to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."28 Ew11 
though Zhou issued another warning on October 10, MacArthur dismissed t hl' 
threat of Chinese intervention during the Wake Island conference with Tru ma 11 
and his advisers on October 15. In private, MacArthur told Truman that "the 
victory was won in Korea" and assured him "the Chinese Communists would 
not attack." During the larger meeting, the UN commander said he expected 
formal resistance would end in Korea by Thanksgiving and hoped to send the 
Eighth Army back to Japan by Christmas. He thought there was "very little" 
chance that either the Chinese or the Soviets would intervene in North Kore:1. 
Should Chinese troops try "to get down to Pyongyang there would be thl' 
greatest slaughter" because of the UN advantage in airpower. 29 
After taking Pyongyang and Wonsan, MacArthur drove his men northward 
toward the Yalu River. Even though the September 27 directive stipulated that 
"no non-Korean ground forces" were to be employed near the Manchuria11 
border, the UN commander gave permission to Walker and the X Corps com-
mander, Gen. Edward M. Almond, to use American troops near the border on 
October 24. The JCS asked MacArthur why he had disregarded their pol icy 
against the use of non-Korean troops near the border. MacArthur replied, i 11 
part, that his September 27 instructions had been superseded by Marshall's 
September 29 admonition to "feel unhampered tactically and strategically 
to proceed north of [the] 38th parallel." This was a dubious interpretation of 
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Marshall's words; the defense secretary had meant tD prod the UN command\'r 
to send his forces across the parallel as quickly as possible, not give him oper;1 -
tional carte blanche for the rest of the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff chose not to 
pursue the incident any further, but MacArthur had damaged his credibility in 
their eyes. Chairman Bradley thought that MacArthur's order to use America11 
troops in northernmost Korea was "not technically insubordinate" but "very 
close." Collins said the JCS recognized that MacArthur had "violated a policy in 
this case without consulting us" and feared he might do so again in an even 
"more serious" matter. 30 
In spite of MacArthur's assurances that the Chinese were unlikely to attack, 
they did in late October, inflicting severe casualties upon the ROK II Corps 
and U.S. First Cavalry Division.31 When the Joint Chiefs asked for an update, 
MacArthur replied on November 4 that the situation was still murky but that 
he doubted the Chinese were actually interceding with their "full potential 
military forces." He thought it illogical for them to do so, argued the evidence 
did not yet suggest they were, and urged the JCS not to leap to "hasty con-
clusions." The Joint Chiefs of Staff found MacArthur's assessment "utterly 
reassuring."32 
That reassurance soon vanished, however, when they learned that MacArthur 
had subsequently ordered his air forces to bomb the bridges over the Yalu River. 
He gave these orders without first clearing them with the JCS, but Lovett, the 
deputy defense secretary, caught wind of them through back channels. On the 
morning of November 6, he consulted with Acheson and Dean Rusk, the assistant 
secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. The three men worried that 
stray bombs might explode in Manchuria and fretted about the international 
complications that might ensue from such an accident. The British would likely 
be angered, since the United States had promised not to attack Manchuria with-
out consulting them. It might complicate the U.S. attempt to persuade the UN 
Security Council to condemn the Chinese incursion. Worse yet, because of the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty, it might even draw the Soviet Union into the war. Lovett 
telephoned Marshall, who agreed that the proposed attacks were ill-advised 
unless UN troops were in danger, an important caveat. Acheson called Truman, 
who was in Missouri preparing to vote in his hometown oflndependence the 
next day. Truman's views were similar to Marshall's. The president was will-
ing to bomb the bridges if UN troops were in imminent peril but agreed with 
Acheson that MacArthur should furnish proof that this was actually the case 
before the mission proceeded.33 
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly cabled MacArthur instructions to suspend 
all air strikes within five miles of the Manchurian border and requested an 
explanation why he thought it necessary to bomb the bridges. Because of the 
fourteen-hour time difference, the telegram arrived in Tokyo in the early hours 
of November 7, just in time to scrub the mission.34 MacArthur responded to 
the JCS message with a fiery one of his own, in which he lodgecj the "gravest 
protest that I can make." Chinese troops and equipment were now "pouring" 
across the Yalu bridges "in large force," necessitating the destruction of those 
structures. "Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American 
and other United Nations blood," he darkly prophesied. Heaping more rebuke 
upon the JCS, he scolded, "I cannot overemphasize the disastrous effect, both 
physical and psychological, that will result from the restrictions which you are 
imposing." He demanded that the matter be taken directly to Truman for exec-
utive decision; otherwise, he refused to accept responsibility for the military 
"calamity" that was likely to occur. 35 
It was still November 6 in Washington when MacArthur's immoderate 
message arrived. The bleak situation it described was in stark contrast to the 
reassuring tones of his November 4 cable. When Truman learned of MacAr-
thur's diatribe, he authorized the attacks, which was in keeping with his earlier 
willingness to do so if UN lives were at stake. The JCS wrote MacArthur, noting 
with much understatement that the situation had "considerably changed" since 
his assessment just two days earlier and authorizing him to attack the Korean side 
of the bridges. His planes were prohibited from violating Manchurian airspace, 
however. The Joint Chiefs reminded the general of the grave consequences that 
might follow if American bombs accidentally fell on Manchuria. Such an error 
might bring general war with China, or worse yet the Soviets, in which case the 
operation would end up costing, rather than saving, UN lives. 36 
Ultimately, the attacks on the bridges were only partly successful and did 
little to keep Chinese troops out ofN orth Korea. 37 Bradley thought that he and 
the rest of the JCS committed "the worst possible error" by failing to reprimand 
MacArthur for not consulting them before ordering the bridge attacks. Marshall 
biographer Ed Cray broadened this criticism to include the defense secretary. 
Among Marshall and the four service chiefs, he argued, only Marshall had 
sufficient stature to restrain MacArthur on such occasions as this. Yet Bradley's 
memoir defended Marshall, arguing that the defense secretary was reluctant 
to interfere with MacArthur because it was not his place to intrude into JCS 
oversight of a commander in the field. Pogue concurred, noting that Marshall 
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would not have tolerated similar intrusion by Secretary of War Henry Sti n1s1111 
during World War II. 38 
MacArthur sent two cables to the JCS on November 7. In one, hesurprisinla\l)· 
suggested that subsequent intelligence had confirmed his initial assessmc111 1 ,t 
November 4 that Chinese forces were not engaged in full-scale interventio11, 
though they still might compel his own troops to retreat. Thus, in the cours1· 
of three days, the UN commander had argued that the Chinese were unlikely 
to intervene fully, that they were about to wipe out his entire command, a111 I 
that they were unlikely to intervene fully though he still might have to retre;11. 
It was little wonder that Acheson thought him "mercurial," though in fairnl'ss 
to MacArthur, Chinese forces on November 6 had unexpectedly begun 111 
disengage and pull back.39 In MacArthur's second message, he complained 
about the restrictions against operating in Manchurian airspace, arguing tha1 
this constraint gave enemy planes a safe haven. His concerns actually found ;1 
sympathetic audience among the JCS and Marshall. They favored allowing UN 
fighter planes to engage in "hot pursuit" of enemy warplanes a short distanr!' 
into Manchuria, but Truman refused because of negative reaction from Amer-
ica's UN allies.40 
On November 7, Marshall sent a message of his own to MacArthur, in 
response to the UN commander's heated cable the day before. Though the 
defense secretary adopted a conciliatory tone, he showed his support for thl' 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. In response to MacArthur's implication that the JCS had 
been acting without consulting the president, Marshall informed him that, to 
the contrary, Truman had been receiving "almost hourly" updates on the situa-
tion in Korea. He reminded the general that more was at stake than merely the 
tactical situation in northern Korea because of the "delicate situation" posed by 
Washington's efforts to persuade the UN Security Council to condemn China. 
Though he assured the general that the administration was "intensely desirous 
of supporting you," he cautioned that the present conflict in Korea "could so 
easily lead to a world disaster."41 
The controversies surrounding MacArthur's use of U.S. troops near the 
Yalu River and his orders to bomb the bridges were both early signs that he 
was less concerned about the dangers of risking general war with China and 
the Soviets than were many of Truman's advisers, including Marshall. This dif-
ference of opinion only deepened. On November 8, the JCS asked MacArthur 
if, in light of Chinese intervention in Korea, he thought it time to reexamine 
his assigned mission of destroying North Korean military forces. MacArthur 
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forcefully replied the next day that it would be "fatal" to settle for any mission that 
stopped short of destroying "all resisting armed forces in Korea" and assisting it 
to become "a united and free nation." It was "immoral" to leave "any portion" 
of North Korea in Chinese hands. He planned to resume offensive operations 
soon. "I recommend with all the earnestness that I possess," he implored, "that 
there be no weakening at this crucial moment and that we press on to complete 
victory which I believe can be achieved if our determination and indomitable 
will do not desert us."42 
The Joint Chiefs ofStaffbelieved differently, which is clear from a November 9 
memorandum. While they stopped short of formally suggesting modification of 
the UN commander's current mission, they considered three military options. 
The first-the MacArthur option-was to drive the Chinese out ofNorth Korea, 
but this might require more troops, of which the United States had few available 
at the moment. The second was to find and hold a defensible line somewhere 
south of the Manchurian border. This option was "apparently feasible" and 
perhaps temporarily "expedient" while Chinese intentions were yet unclear, 
though the JCS were loath to get quagmired in Korea. The third option was 
voluntarily to evacuate the Korean Peninsula and leave it in Communist hands, 
but this option would "so lower the worldwide prestige of the United States 
that it would be totally unacceptable." The real significance of the document, 
however, lies in its preference for a political solution to the Korean War-if 
possible through the United Nations-rather than a military one. Marshall 
endorsed the memorandum, so this reflected his thinking as well. That the JCS 
expressed this preference before the second, more devastating, Chinese offensive 
oflate November is all the more telling. "From the military standpoint," they 
argued, "the continued commitment of U.S. forces in Korea is at the expense of 
the more useful strategic deployment of those forces elsewhere." This sentence 
effectively summarized the view that not only the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also 
Marshall and Truman took regarding the Korean War. It was a view with which 
MacArthur disagreed so intensely, so often, and so publicly that it eventually 
cost him his job.43 
The UN commander launched his offensive on November 24, but the Chinese 
began their second offensive the next day, hitting MacArthur's troops hard. "We 
face an entirely new war," MacArthur admitted to the JCS on November 28, 
informing them that he would now shift to the defensive.44 The Chinese offensive 
wrought angst and uncertainty in Washington. At a National Security Council 
meeting on November 28, there was general consensus that the United States 
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should avoid total war with China, a view shared by Marsl1all. I-le did not wanr 
to get "sewed up in Korea" and thought the United States should extricate itsel r 
while simultaneously retaining national honor, though he was unsure how to d( i 
this. 45 Secretary Acheson wanted MacArthur to "find a line that we can hold,·· 
but MacArthur soon dashed hopes of holding any defensive line across North 
Korea, arguing he did not have enough troops to do so. He suggested reinforcing 
his command with Nationalist Chinese troops from Formosa, a proposal the 
JCS met with skepticism because it might "disrupt" the UN alliance.46 
On December 2, Marshall was still fretting about the "great dilemma of 
determining how we could save our troops and protect our national honor al 
the same time," though acknowledging that the United States could not consci-
entiously merely abandon South Korea. At a Pentagon war council on Decem. 
ber 3, there was discussion of the possibility of a UN cease-fire, but Acheson 
worried that the Chinese would demand too great a price in exchange, perhaps 
admission to the United Nations or U.S. abandonment of Formosa. That sam(' 
day, the JCS wrote MacArthur acknowledging that "the preservation of your 
forces is now the primary consideration," and authorizing him to consolidate· 
his troops into coastal beachheads.47 These were trying times; in fact, Bradley 
found them more trying than even the Battle of the Bulge had been. "We ha V( · 
lived with danger for some years," Marshall told the staff of the American Rel I 
Cross on December 4. "Now that danger has become acute. The events of tlw 
next few weeks-or even days-may determine the course of our civilization 
for long years to come."48 
Finally, Truman and his advisers received some good news on December ii. 
General Collins had just returned from a trip to Japan and Korea at Marshall\ 
urging. Having seen the situation firsthand, the army chief of staff was confidc111 
that the Eighth Army would make an orderly retreat to Pusan. While acknowl 
edging that the First Marine Division was in a "serious" fight near the Changji 11 
( Chosin) Reservoir, he was optimistic that the X Corps would be able to evacu a11 · 
the Hamhung-Hungnam area by sea and disembark at Pusan, as well. Rc;1s 
sembled UN troops should then be able to hold out in Pusan "indefinitely." I 11 
short, Collins did not think the UN forces were actually "in a critical condition" 
or that they were in imminent danger of being expelled from the peninsu Li. 1'' 
As the administration groped for a way to meet Marshall's twin hopes 111 
extrication from Korea yet with honor intact, it became clear that, in ordn I<, 
avoid negotiating with the Chinese from a position of weakness, UN fo1Yn, 
were first going to have to inflict significant casualties upon the enemy. · I hi•, 
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was the position that Marshall took. so On December 29, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
informed MacArthur that "successful resistance to Chinese-North Korean 
aggression at some position in Korea and a deflation of the military and politi-
cal prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of great importance to our 
national interests." He was now to "defend in successive positions"-that is, 
conduct an orderly, fighting withdrawal from one defensive line to another-and 
inflict "such damage to hostile forces" as he could while incurring a minimum 
oflosses himself. 51 
To MacArthur, this message indicated that Washington had lost the "will 
to win." If only he was permitted to use his "full military might, without arti-
ficial restrictions," he believed that he could both "save Korea" and so damage 
the military and industrial capabilities of Communist China that it would be 
rendered harmless for "generations to come." To that end, he wrote back to the 
JCS on December 30 suggesting a blockade of China, destruction of Chinese 
factories by airpower as well as naval gunfire, and employment of Nationalist 
Chinese troops not only as reinforcements in Korea but also on "diversionary" 
missions against the mainland of China itself. Addressing the concern that 
broadening the war would result in full-scale war with China, he replied that 
China was already fully engaged. He could not say whether the Soviets would 
become involved, but this did not seem to trouble him. 52 
After serious consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they sent a negative 
reply on January 9. There could be no blockade of China without the agreement 
of the United Nations, particularly the British. The JCS rejected bombing tar-
gets in China, unless the Chinese attacked U.S. interests outside of Korea first. 
They rejected sending Nationalist Chinese troops to Korea. Although they 
made a tantalizing suggestion that such troops likely had "greater usefulness 
elsewhere," they did not authorize their use against China. Instead, the JCS 
reaffirmed their earlier instructions to MacArthur to fight defensively from 
one position to the next, maximizing enemy casualties while minimizing his 
own. They would continue to consider MacArthur's proposals, but in the end, 
never agreed to any of them. 53 
A major turning point in the war occurred on December 23, when General 
Walker died in a jeep accident. At MacArthur's urging, the Pentagon promptly 
replaced him with Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who had served under Marshall 
in Tientsin, China, during the 1920s. He had also graduated with Collins in the 
West Point class of 1917, then briefly served under him during the Normandy 
invasion, during which I{ idgway parachuted into France as the commander of 
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the Eighty-Second Airborne Division. Later, he rose tu command the XV 111 
Airborne Corps, and more recently, was serving as Collins's deputy ch icf', ,1 
staff for operations and administration in the Pentagon. 54 
Meanwhile, the Chinese army was losing much of its potency. About 011<· 
third of its combat troops had already become casualties, either because 11I 
combat or the extremely cold conditions. The further southward it pushed, the• 
more its supply problems worsened. Some of the initial advantages enjoyed hy 
the Chinese, such as high morale and the element of surprise, had disappean•1 I. 
UN forces, meanwhile, still enjoyed superiority in airpower, armor, artillery, 
and communications. 55 In addition to these advantages, they now had Ridgwn y. 
one of the outstanding American combat commanders of the twentieth century. 
On December 31, Chinese forces launched their third offensive, which pushed 
Ridgway's Eighth Army below the thirty-eighth parallel, forcing him oncl' 
again to evacuate Seoul. MacArthur predicted on January 10 that his curren1 
troop limitations and operational restraints would make the "military position 
of the command in Korea untenable," but events soon proved him mistaken. 
Ridgway's forces began to strike back in late January and started regaining 
lost ground. 56 
The question arose whether they should be permitted once again to con-
duct operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel. On February 23, Acheson 
recommended against "a general advance north of the general vicinity of the 
38th parallel." Before submitting this recommendation to Truman, he ran it by 
Marshall first. The defense secretary consulted the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as 
the secretaries of the army, navy, and air force, and received conflicting advice. 
While the three service secretaries agreed with Acheson, the JCS disagreed, and 
Marshall sided with them. In a letter to Acheson asking him not to submit the 
recommendation to Truman, Marshall argued that UN forces needed "freedom 
of action and freedom of maneuver." Acheson relented, leaving Ridgway free 
to operate north of the parallel as opportunities presented. In the meantime, 
the Eighth Army commander launched on March 7 Operation RIPPER, which 
liberated Seoul and pushed enemy troops back across the parallel. 57 
While the Eighth Army was battling the Chinese People's Liberation 
Army, Marshall was engaged in the "great debate" over the size and role of the 
U.S. armed forces. Congress and the Truman administration had drastically 
decreased defense spending after World War II, from $83.0 billion in fiscal year 
1945, to $9.1 billion in fiscal year 1948, and $13.7 billion in fiscal year 1950. 58 The 
armed forces shrank from 12.1 million personnel in 1945 to 1.5 million in mid-
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1950. Nine of the army's ren divisions and both marine divisions were under-
strength. 59 Truman disingenuously blamed Congress, the news media, and the 
American people for these reductions in defense spending, but Millett argues 
that the president had been their "principal architect."60 Now one of Marshall's 
responsibilities was to help rebuild his country's armed forces one final time. 
"I was getting rather hardened to coming in when everything h~d gone to pot 
and there was nothing you could get your hands on," he later observed, "and 
darned ifI didn't find the same thing when I came into the Korean War. There 
wasn't anything."61 
The proponents of expansion had received a boost back in April 1950, when 
the National Security Council advanced the first draft ofNSC-68, a white paper 
calling for the buildup ofU. S. national defenses to serve as a deterrent to Soviet 
aggression. Debate ensued within the administration over adopting NSC-68, 
but the onset of the Korean War-and the limited options imposed on the 
Pentagon because of the reductions to the armed forces-gave momentum to 
advocates of a larger military.62 
The initial defense budget for fiscal year 1951, which ran from July 1, 1950, 
to June 30, 1951, was just $13.3 billion. That budget was not signed until Sep-
tember 6, 1950, more than two months into the fiscal year and more than two 
months since the North Korean invasion in June. Secretary Johnson already 
had requested additional defense funding from Congress in July, and Congress 
passed a supplemental budget bill on September 23, which included $11.7 billion 
more for defense. 63 Even with the defense budget now grown to $25 billion, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that roughly $20 billion more was still needed in the 
current fiscal year in order to pursue the robust military structure envisioned 
by NSC-68. Consequently, the Pentagon requested on December 1 a little more 
than $16.8 billion of additional spending.64 
That December, Marshall played a central role in making the administration's 
case for more defense funds, though the recent Chinese offensive made members 
of Congress receptive to the request. In fact, at times Marshall found himself 
explaining why he was not asking for more than the $16.8 billion. During a hear-
ing before a House subcommittee on December 1, he explained that unless the 
country was actually in a general war, "this is about as fast as you can efficiently 
digest these sums of money."65 In testimony before the Senate Appropriations 
Committee on December 9, Marshall again stressed that it was "better not to 
try to rush things beyond the immediate capability of expansion."66 On Decem-
ber 13, Truman, Marshall, Acheson, and others met with eighteen congressional 
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leaders from both parties to advocate additional funding. Marshall explairn;d 
to lawmakers that while the United States should have sufficient strength 1,, 
defend in Korea, it needed additional troops to maintain the security ofJap:111 
and Western Europe.67 
In the end, Congress granted all but $49 million of the amount requestt'd 
by the Department of Defense. With this $16.8 billion, plus an addition,1 I 
$6.4 billion in May, the defense budget for fiscal year 1951 ended up being 
$48.2 billion, while actual outlays during the fiscal year were $23.6 billion.''" 
From June 30, 1950, to the same date in 1951, armed forces personnel mon· 
than doubled, from 1.5 million to 3.2 million. The army grew to fifteen full -
strength divisions, plus three more below strength. The marines now had 
two full-strength divisions, plus a regimental combat team. The air forct' 
now maintained seventy-two combat wings, up from forty-two during tht' 
prior year. The navy's ship-force level had risen from 634 vessels to 980; ii' 
now operated twenty-six aircraft carriers instead of fifteen and eighty-three 
submarines instead of seventy-two.69 
A larger military became the norm during the Cold War. Defense spending 
reached $46.1 billion in fiscal year 1952 and never fell below $42 billion again. 
According to Cray, Marshall had "shaped United States military policy for 
another generation."70 Two caveats should be added, however. First, Marshall 
had by no means accomplished this singlehandedly; NSC-68 existed even before 
his return to Truman's cabinet in September 1950. Second, the military policy 
that emerged was not precisely the one Marshall would have chosen, since it 
did not include universal military training, which he regarded as an essential 
component.71 Nevertheless, Marshall played a prominent role in increasing the 
size of the U.S. military during the Cold War. 
Marshall also found himself in the middle of the sad drama surrounding 
Truman's decision to relieve MacArthur in April 1951. The UN commander 
vehemently differed with Truman, as well as with Marshall and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, over the wisdom of expanding the war into Manchuria, and, more 
broadly, the importance of the Far East to American security. That MacArthur 
held dissenting views was not necessarily a problem. That he would not quit 
sharing his views publicly was a big problem indeed. 
He had only been UN commander for a couple of months when he wrote a 
public letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars that implied criticism of Truman 
for not properly understanding the importance of Formosa. Truman learned 
of the letter in advance and ordered MacArthur to withdraw it, which he did, 
M/11/SII/\I L /\Nil 1111: KOI/ E/\N WAH 205 
though it still appeared in rhe September 1 edition of U.S. News and World 
Report. The president was so frustrated that he considered replacing MacArthur 
with Bradley as the UN commander.72 After UN fortunes rose with Inchon 
and fell with the Chinese foray into North Korea, MacArthur made a series of 
injudicious remarks, which appeared in the New York Times in early December. 
In an interview conducted by U.S. News and World Report, but appearing first 
in print in the Times on December 2, MacArthur complained that the rules of 
engagement forced upon him were an "enormous handicap, without prece-
dent in military history." In the same edition of the Times, he complained to 
Hugh Ballie, the president of United Press, about the Europe-first orientation 
favored by Truman, Marshall, and the JCS. It was "fallacious" to believe that 
the expenditure of military effort in Asia detracted from the security of Europe, 
he opined. "If the fight is not waged with courage and invincible determination 
to meet the challenge here, it will indeed be fought, and possibly lost, on the 
battlefields ofEurope."73 
These indiscretions raised the ire of the president, who wrote a letter to 
Acheson and Marshall on December 5 stating that "military commanders and 
diplomatic representatives" serving abroad "should be ordered to exercise 
extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with 
their departments," and to avoid communicating directly with the media regard-
ing either foreign policy or military policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded 
the letter to MacArthur for his "guidance and appropriate action."74 
Nevertheless, MacArthur soon committed additional indiscretions. By 
mid-March, UN forces had sufficiently bloodied the Chinese army that the 
Truman administration was ready to negotiate. Before Truman could issue 
a communique offering to do so, MacArthur beat him to the punch with a 
pronouncement ofhis own on March 24. The UN commander's communique 
created a firestorm in Washington for its bellicosity and its implied criticism of 
Truman. After mockingly recounting the military and industrial limitations of 
the Chinese, MacArthur declared: 
Even under the inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United 
Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue 
to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by 
force of arms the conquest of Korea. 
The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision 
of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the 
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war to the area of Korea through expansion ofour lllilitary operations Lo 
his coastal areas and inferior bases would doom Red China to the risk of 
imminent military collapse. 
So inflammatory was MacArthur's message that the president did not ev(·11 
bother to send his own offer of negotiation. Moreover, Truman understandably 
regarded this as a violation of his December policy. The president, according I< 1 
his memoirs, now silently resolved to relieve the UN commander.75 
MacArthur had actually already committed another indiscretion, thougl 1 
it would still take a few days to play out. Congressman Joseph Martin, th!' 
Republican minority leader, had written to him on March 8, soliciting his 
views on the Korean situation, particularly the use of Nationalist Chinest: 
troops. MacArthur replied on March 20, four days before his controversi:il 
communique to China. He not only endorsed the use of the Nationalist Chines(' 
but also laid bare his fundamental disagreement with Truman and Marsha 11 
over grand strategy: 
It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where 
the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global 
conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; 
that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still 
fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall 
of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid 
war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There 
is no substitute for victory. 
Martin formally read MacArthur's letter in Congress on Aprils, which set in 
motion the final train of events culminating in MacArthur's relief.76 
From April 6 to April 9, Marshall took part in a series of meetings regarding 
MacArthur's fate. The defense secretary's first impulse was caution. During 
a Friday morning meeting on April 6, which included Truman, presidential 
assistant Averell Harriman, Acheson, and Bradley, Marshall was fearful that 
relieving MacArthur might make Congress unwilling to pass the increased mil-
itary appropriation the Department of Defense was seeking.77 Later-probably 
during a meeting with Bradley, Acheson, and Harriman in the defense secre-
tary's office that same afternoon-Marshall suggested summoning MacArthur 
to Washington for consultation before making a final decision about his relief. 
Acheson, all too aware of the UN commander's "histrionic abilities" with the 
M/\l!Sll/11 L /\Nil I !IL KUIO: /\N W/\H i' ll/ 
public and influence< 111 1 l1t· :1 n1 ll'd forces, was horrified at the possible spcctaclt· 
of MacArthur's return to the nation's capital, arrayed "in the full panoply ofh is 
commands," ready to defend his reputation and position. Acheson persuadt'd 
Marshall to drop the idea.78 
Marshall was still reluctant to recommend MacArthur's relief on Saturday, 
April 7. Bradley believed there were other reasons for his r~ticence besides 
his fear regarding defense appropriations. Marshall and Bradley were both 
concerned that it might be difficult to prove a formal charge of insubordina-
tion against the UN commander. The JCS chairman also suspected Marshall 
dreaded the "savage right-wing political assault" that he knew would come 
his way ifhe supported MacArthur's dismissal, and believed Marshall did not 
want to give credence to rumors that he held a long-standing grudge against 
MacArthur. After meeting with Truman on Saturday morning, Bradley and 
Marshall considered, then abandoned, a last-minute plot to save MacArthur's 
job by writing him a stern letter to "shut up."79 
On Sunday, April 8, the Joint Chiefs of Staff convened and, according to 
Collins, decided to "concur in the relief of General MacArthur by the Presi-
dent." Collins and the other chiefs of staff were "a sad and sober group of men" 
as they trooped to Marshall's office at 4:05 P.M. to share their decision. Marshall 
"made no comment of his own," according to Bradley, but instructed him to 
inform Truman the next morning. At the climactic meeting on Monday, April 9, 
Bradley summarized the views of the JCS for Truman. Though Bradley did not 
have voting rights on the JCS as chairman, his memoirs note that "it was clear 
to Truman that I concurred with the JCS views, as did Marshall." Truman and 
Acheson both remembered Marshall stating his concurrence directly. Though 
initially reluctant to support MacArthur's relief, the secretary of defense had 
finally swung around. With the concurrence of Harriman and Acheson, who 
were also present, Truman finally informed his advisers that he had already 
decided to relieve MacArthur several days earlier. The news went public on 
Wednesday, April 11, at the awkward hour of one in the morning, Washington 
time. 80 Truman assured the public that it was with "deep regret" that he had 
reached his decision. "I was sorry to have to reach a parting of the way with 
the big man in Asia," he wrote to Gen. Dwight Eisenhower the next day, "but 
he asked for it and I had to give it to him."81 MacArthur returned to the United 
States to a hero's welcome, intensified by public opposition to Truman. In spite 
of the headaches MacArthur had caused, Marshall treated him courteously, 
coordinating the general's famous appearance before a special joint session of 
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Congress on April 19 and attending a ceremony in his honor at the Was hi ngll 111 
Monument on that same date. 82 
The dismissal of MacArthur prompted a Senate investigation, in which 1111' 
defense secretary was required to testify for seven days. Marshall drew a carl'f11 I 
contrast between MacArthur's views and those of the administration. He assu n·t I 
senators that while he, Truman, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to stl 111 
Communist "aggression" in Korea, they also "persistently sought to confine tl11· 
conflict to Korea and to prevent its spreading into a third world war." MacArthur, 
by contrast, "would have us, on our own initiative, carry the conflict beyond 
Korea against the mainland of Communist China, both from the sea and fro111 
the air." This would have risked not just a wider war with China, but war wi I I 1 
the Soviets and America's abandonment by its allies. Marshall had not been 
troubled that MacArthur disagreed with the administration. "What is new," lw 
explained, "and what has brought about the necessity for General MacArthur's 
removal, is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater commander 
publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement with the foreign 
and military policy of the United States."83 It later fell to Bradley to utter tht· 
most memorable line from the MacArthur hearings. Addressing MacArthur's 
proposal to widen the war against China, the JCS chairman observed, "This 
strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong 
time, and with the wrong enemy."84 
MacArthur's relief necessitated a shuffling of the UN command structure. At 
the same April 9 meeting, Marshall and Bradley recommended that Ridgway 
assume MacArthur's various command positions, and that Gen. James Van 
Fleet take Ridgway's place as commander of the Eighth Army. Van Fleet had 
been one of Collins's trusted subordinates as the commander of the Eighth 
Infantry Regiment, Fourth Division, VII Corps, during the Normandy inva-
sion. Van Fleet had not initially been a favorite of Marshall's, however. Army 
lore has it that Marshall, as army chief of staff, had been reluctant to promote 
him because he confused him for another officer with a similar last name who 
had a drinking problem. Millett suggested that the real reason for Marshall's 
reticence had been Van Fleet's mediocrity as a staff officer. He was anything but 
mediocre as a combat commander, however, and was commanding III Corps 
by the end of the war. Marshall, in fact, later admitted that he was "probably 
the most aggressive and hard driving corps commander developed by [the] U.S. 
during the war." More recently, Van Fleet had directed the military mission to 
Greece, in support of the Truman Doctrine. 85 
Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall (center) , Gen. MatthewB. Ridgway (back 
left), and Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet (back right), commanding general of the Eighth 
Army, prepare to depart by jeep for X Corps headquarters in Hongchon, Korea. 
June 8, 1951. Courtesy George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Va. 
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UN soldiers continued to pummel Chinese and Nori h Korean troops int lw 
months after Ridgway was bumped up to UN commander and Van Fleet w:1.~ 
assigned to command the Eighth Army. Exercising the latitude that Marsh a 11 
preserved for them, UN forces pushed generally north of the thirty-eighth pa 1• 
allel, occupying lines more defensible than the parallel itself. 86 InJune, Marsha 11 
traveled to Japan to confer with Ridgway. The UN commander accompa n ic< I 
him to Korea, where they flew through dangerously foul weather so Marshall 
could view the front. Back in Japan, Marshall admitted to Ridgway that eVl'l'I 
he had not realized conditions were so bad. According to Col.James T. Quirk, 
who was also present, Marshall contemplated advising Truman to warn tilt' 
Chinese that if they did not agree to end the war in Korea, "we are going I<, 
give them a taste of the atom."87 
No atomic attacks proved necessary to produce peace, though it did requin· 
two agonizing years of negotiations between the Communists and the Unitl'd 
Nations. Meanwhile, soldiers continued to suffer death or injury: 45 percent< ,1 
American casualties in Korea occurred afterthe truce talks began.88 Finally, 
the delegates-though none from South Korea-signed an armistice on July 1.1. 
1953, recognizing a permanent division between North and South Korea nc:11· 
the thirty-eighth parallel. 
Marshall had long since retired by then. True to his word, he stepped dow 11 
as defense secretary on September 12, 1951, just a few days short of one full ye;1 r. 
During his year running the Pentagon, he had taken part in several import,1111 
decisions. 89 The decision to allow MacArthur to conduct operations north < ,1 
the thirty-eighth parallel in September 1950 was deeply consequential, becatts,, 
it led to Chinese intervention. Yet there was no realistic opportunity to destroy 
the Korean People's Army without doing so. IfUN forces had merely chasl', I 
the KPA across the parallel before leaving Korea, the Republic of Korea wou I, I 
scarcely have been any safer than it had been in June 1950, before the Nori Ii 
Korean invasion. 
The decision to deny MacArthur's request to expand the war into Manchtt ri;1 
was especially significant. While it made it much harder-though probably 111 ,, 
militarily impossible-to defeat the Chinese in Korea, it also quite possibly 
avoided a potential World War III. 90 MacArthur, however, with his pen ch ;1111 
for grandiosity, was temperamentally unsuited to fight the sort oflimitcd w:11 
that his superiors in Washington requested of him. 
Marshall's successful effort in preserving Ridgway's freedom of action n< >rt I 1 
of the parallel in the spring of 1951 was also important, for at least three rcas< 111~ . 
MARSHALL AND THE KOREAN WAR 211 
It prevented the parallel from becoming an artificial barrier behind which 
Communist forces could regroup, thus empowering UN forces to engage and 
attrit them north of the parallel; it allowed UN forces to recapture some ground 
north of the parallel, which ultimately became South Korean territory; and it 
enabled them to occupy lines that were more easily defensible than the strictly 
east-west latitude line had been.91 
Marshall's contributions as defense secretary to enlarging the military 
enhanced his already firmly established reputation as a builder of armies. In 
mid-1950, the United States simply did not possess armed forces large enough to 
project power in Asia and Europe simultaneously, as the doctrine of containment 
required. Beginning with fiscal year 1951, however, larger defense budgets and 
force structures became the norm. Even so, the United States would learn soon 
enough the limits of its military power in the jungles of Vietnam. 
Though Marshall had been reluctant to recommend MacArthur's relief 
from command, he was finally persuaded to do so. In the final months of his 
long public-service career, Marshall thus reaffirmed the principle of civilian 
control over the military, one of his bedrock beliefs. It is regrettable that the 
MacArthur-Truman controversy ended the way it did, and it is tempting to 
wonder if Marshall might have been able to save MacArthur from himself if 
he had intervened forcefully earlier. But to have done so would have violated 
another of his beliefs, that the responsibility to oversee a theater commander 
was properly vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not the secretary of defense. 
Finally, Marshall's tenure as defense secretary proved again his remarkable 
sense of duty. It not only cost him a year of his life but also subjected him to intense 
stress and withering criticism from the hard-right wing of the Republican Party.92 
In accepting Marshall's resignation in September 1951, Truman acknowledged 
that "one time after another" he had "responded to the call to public service" 
and had done so in exemplary fashion. "You have earned your retirement many 
fold," the president closed, "and I wish you many good years at Leesburg."93 
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